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France during the German Occupation was divided into 
two zones, the northern two/thirds, directly occupied 
by German troops, and the southern zone, which remained 
until -1942 an independent French state. However France, 
divided more than physically, can also be broken down 
into three groups, the Collaborators and the Resisters, 
who responded actively to the Occupation, and Passive 
France, the large majority of French people who allowed 
events to run their course without attempting actively 
to shape them. 
This thesis, rather than a history of France from 
1940 through 1944, will examine these three categories 
of response to the occupation. \I/hy did some collaborate, 
some resist, and the majority remain passive? 'ii/hat role 
did the prewar period play in furthering this division 
of France? Were there general attitudes about France 
and her relationship to Germany and to the Allies that 
characterized each group as a whole? What ideas about 
the political, social, and economic future of France mo-
tivitated each group? Finally, what was the significance 
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The collaborators, defined as those who actively shaped 
policies ot tried to, openly voiced pro-collaboration senti-
ments, and those who worked, out of choice, with the Ger-
mans, included a wide variety of. pepple with a wide range 
of ideas. They can be broken down into two categories: 
official collaborators, which includes the prominent Vichy 
leaders such as Petain and Laval, the less visible but no 
less important corps of civil servants, and unofficial col-
laborator~, which includes the ideological collaboration of 
fascist writers such as Drieu la Rochelle and Robert Brasil-
lach and of leaders of fascist groups such as Jacques Doriot, 
and the opportunistic collaboration of journalists( several 
members of the pre-war Left, and profiteers. This distinc-
tion is made simply on the basis of the holding of an offi-
cial position of power and does not imply that official col-
laborators had no ideology. 
Collaboration was a decision to work with Germany. To 
understand why men like Petain and the fascists, whose tra-
ditional orientation had been nationalistic and anti-German, 
chose this path is the focus of this chapter. The role of 
the prewar years was crucial to this decision. In the ini-
tial post-World War One period, the two opposing forces, 
the traditionalists, who were never reconciled to the prin-
ciples of the Revolution and wished for a return to social 
1 
hierarchy, rural decentralized society, and even in some 
cases monarchy, and the Jacobin Left, socialists, syndi-
catists and communists who pushed for a strong centralized 
state and a planned economy, were balanced by a wide middle 
range of Liberals who espoused political and legal liber-
alism, universal suffrage, and equalLty, but were socially 
conservative and opposed to an active state. Thus, al-
though France on the surface was turbulent, underneath was 
a fairly stable balance and a broad consensus of middle 
class, liberal beliefs, the "Republican synthesis". 
Developments in the mid-thirties, both internal and 
external, were to shatter this balance. In 1933 Hitler 
came to power in Germany. The world wide depression was 
finally felt in France. Several ministers were suspected 
of shielding a fraudulent financier named Stavisky from 
prosecution. Veterans' pensions were cut back. All of 
this catalyzed the Right into action and on February 6, 
1934, massive demonstrations rocked Paris, causing the 
Prime Minister to resign. In response to this uprising of 
the Right at home and the threat of fascism abroad, the 
Socialists, Communists,! and the Radicals formed a coal-
ition, the Popular Front, which came to power in 1936 with 
the election of L60n Blum. The Popular Front was unable 
to resolve the economic crisis primarily because they did 
not have specific formulas for the scale and type of reform 
needed. The Spanish Civil War accentuated the Left-Right 
polarization of France and created a rift in the coalition 
between pacifists who wanted to avoid war at all costs, 
and those who felt the threat of fascism would have to be 
2 
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fought. The Popular Front was unable to bring about wide -
scale reform. It did, however, alarm the Right, who saw 
it as a Communist takeover. The Right was leaning more 
and more towards appeasement of Germany to prevent the spread 
of Bolshevism and to avoid war and disaster. The Third 
Republic was unable to overcome this polarization and went 
through a series of crises and ministers until the defeat 
of 1940)when it voted itself out of existence. 
I . Those who collahorated in 1940 had already chosen sides 
in the mid-thirtieso Most collaborators had been members 
o~ the pre-war Right, those who had participated in the 
nationalist demonstrations o~ 1934, those removed from o~­
fice or defeated by the Popular Front in the 1936 elections, 
and leaders o~ prot~fascist leagues or veterans groups. 
In general, they were alienated ~rom or antagonized by the 
Third Republic. The traditionalists, members of the old 
upper class who had had wealth but little political influ-
ence, resented the Third depublic and yearned for a return 
~~tJJtf\{'rQJVt (~l\kJ(y 
to the conditions in the days of France's greatness. These 
1\ 
men became the prominent Vichy leaders and set the tone 
for Vichy but in the end were unable to set the direction, 
which is why Paxton calls Vichy "the last stand of men who 
believed a nation could exert world influence without pass-
ing through the industrial revolution". 1 
The bureaucrats, a highly trained and select group 
of administrators, felt vastly superior to the elected 
deputies from whom they had taken orders. In 1940, they 
finally had the freedom they wanted and ultimately they 
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played a crucial role in the direction of Vichy}internal 
politics. Many journalists had also been highly alien-
ated from the 'Third Republic. The overabundance of journ-
alists in an industry controlled almost exclusively by 
several large financiers created an underpaid, underem-
ployed and resentful group that delighted in the demise 
of the Third Republic and the freedom it gave them. 
Fimlly, and most surprisingly, were the few members 
of the pre-war Left coalition who found their way into the 
collaborationist camp. Men such as Marcel Deat, Charles 
Spinasse, find f.larcel Bucard, who were ardent pacifists, 
were uncomfortable in the Popular Front coalition. They 
were apprehensive about the ,communists and, by 1940, were 
disillusioned with the Parliamentary system's inability 
to act. Although their political ideas were in opposi-' 
tion to conservative or fascist ideas, they may have seen 
collaboration as an opportunity to accomplish their goals 
in a strong state. 
With the exception of the Leftists, collaborators had 
been on the Right of the political spectrum. The first 
problem to confront them was the external Franco-German 
one. In 1940, collaboration meant a decision to accept 
Germany's victory over France as definitive. This was an 
important choice, as there were other options that were 
given serious consideration. Plans were made to go to 
North Africa and continue the fight from there. In June 
1940 Francets navy was still intact, General Nogu~rl forces 
in North Africa were ready to fight and supplies were on 
their way from the United States. Yet the government de-
----~ 
cided not to continue the fight, partly because it seemed 
militarily unfeasible. The French army, victors of World 
War I, had been defeated in less than six weeks. If they 
could not withstand Germany's might, who. could? On June 
16 Marshall Petain threatened to resign if he could not 
sue for peace. "'-- The experience of World War I also lead 
to a strong desire, in the population as well as the gov-
ernment, to avoid the chaos and destruction of turning 
France into a battleground. Russia's experience in 1917 
led() many to believe that continued warfare not only meant 
destruction but revolution and communism. Finally.,. the 
country as compared to its World War I rally uTo Berlin" 
was so internally divided that there was no unified drive 
f<.i mod 
to fight the Germans. Thus BsiaatcI turned over the Prime 
Ministry to Philippe Petain, who asked f~r an Armistice. 
The existence of a French state in the unoccupied zone 
meant that a certain amount of collaboration would be in-
evitable. However, other important assumptions were made 
that caused collaboration with Germany to go far beyond 
this minimum. Central to the decision to collaborate was 
the supposition that Germany was the wave of the future 
and that France's best policy was to work towards a Euro-
pean bloc with Germany the centrifugal force and France 
an autonomous partner. This bloc wuuld be able to withstand 
the imperiali'sm of Great Britain, the United States, and 
Russia and would be itself an imperialistic power in Africa, 
France's escape vitale and a major source of raw materials 
for Eur9pe. 
5 
O££icially, this attempt to build a new order took 
the £orm o£ incessant o££ers o£ closer collaboration in 
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return £or a definitive peace treaty that would normalize 
relations between the two countries and lessen the puni-
tive aspects o£ the armistice. Petain, in a speech o£ 
August 14, 1941, lamented that "our relations with Germany 
are defined by an Armistice the character o£ which can 
only be provisional tr • 2 He went on to ask the French to 
ttsurmount the heavy heritage o£ mistrust bequeathed by 
centuries o£ dissension and quarrels, in order to orient 
ourselves towards the larger perspectives of a reconciled 
continent tJ • 3 On October 22, 1941, Petain and Laval met 
with Hitler and Ribbentrop in the town o£ Montoire. In 
spite o£ Laval's postwar claim that he udid not engineer 
this meetingil4 they were, according to Robert Paxton's 
research into German archives, the culmination o£ months 
of French entreaty.5 The meetings were highly publicized 
".. 
but all that came o£ them was that "Marshal Petain and 
Chancellor Hitler agreed on the principle o£ collaboration 
to reconstruct peace in Europe ll • 6 
Viehy leaders were supported in their e££orts to re-
order France's external situation by the uno£ficial collab-
orators. Robert Brasillach, a fascist essayist and journ-
alist, agreed with the principle o£ collaboration because 
"the politics o£ Montoire is the onll course open to France 
••• we are £or collaboration with dignitl, because it is 
simply the only means to pull ourselves through and to 
avoid the return o£ the bloody errors that lead us to this 
atrocious and lost war".! 
Drieu LaRochelle, a novelist and fascist essayist, 
saw the question in terms of huge masses. To him, the 
20 th Century was the century of continents dominated by 
the hegemony of one nation, such as the United States in 
the Western hemisphere and Japan in Asia. Faced with 
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these vast agglomerations, Drieu felt Europe had to re-
group if she were not to perish. France, "only one ele-
ment among other elements of the first class u8 , could no 
longer make it on her own as a world power and would there-
fore have to take her place . in a Europe of hierarchical 
forces. Germany, the uincomparable force to which hege-
mony can no longer be disputed or refused,,9, would be in 
the middle surrounded by the next largest powers, England, 
Italy, and France, and then a whole degradation of smaller 
powers. 10 
Lucien Rebatet, another fascist writer, had none of 
Drieuts or Brasillach's hesitancy in accepting France's 
defeat and was the only writer I found to do so out of ad-
miration for Germany's internal system. flWhat possibly 
can the 1942 generation of French hate in the Germans? 
After all, their knowledge of Germany is nil, they don't 
want to learn anything, and they only hold childish ideas 
about them. These are therefore the prejudices that it 
is important to fight first of all." 11 He felt that the 
"liquidation of an interminable quarrel" between France 
and Germany would be none of the grand events in the his-
tory of this Planet".12 
Jacques Doriot, leader of the protofascist Parti Popu-
laire FranraiSr, called for collaboration with Germany, 
who, because of its powerful economic organization and 
its political situation, would become the key to the en-
tire European system. He felt that France would only be 
strengthened by adapting herself to the economy of a con-
tinental bloc. 
These pro-German leanings were strengthened by grow-
ing anti-British feelings. To the collaborators, England 
had, with a system of alliances, leJ:l France into the war 
and deserted her at Dunkirk. The bombing of the French 
navy on July 4, 1940, at Mers-el-Kebir exacerbated this 
tension and the situation in North Africa in 1941 almost 
caused it to break out into full-fledged war. England's 
attacks and advances in Africa were always taken to be 
aggressions against France. It was at this point that 
French and German interests most closely coincided and 
therefore that French collaboration went the farthest. 
Vichy was determined not to loose "a square yard of her 
home territory nor yet of her colonial empire n13 , even if 
that meant ffa reordering of so-called 'traditional' ex-
ternal friendships ot enmities. n14 Throughout 1941 Vichy 
forces fought off Anglo-Gaullist attacks in North Africa 
and Syria. In May, 1941, the Protocols of Paris were 
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signed allowing Germany to use Syrian airfields and mili-
tary supplies to exploit the anti-British uprising in Iraq. 
After they signed, Admiral Fran~ois Darlan, then the foreign 
minister of Vichy, expressed his anger at England, nwho 
treats us like a continental Ireland, indeed like a colo-
ny. ,, 15 
strong resentment towards England was also expressed 
by the unofficial collaborators. Abel Bonnard, a member 
of the Academme Fransaise and a conservative with fascist 
leanings, accused England of "dragging France into this 
war where she so poorly supported us n16 and then having 
the nerve to speak of France as having sold out to the 
enemy. "Without a doubt, England calls sold governments 
she could not buy.,,17 
9 
Lucien Rebatet blamed the war entirely on two agents, 
"Jews and Great Britain".18 He allegorized France as an 
innocent virgin whose maidenhood was torn to pieces by 
her evil guardians in London who sent her alone to meet 
the big bad wolf. 19 
Drieu LaRochelle accused England of being the "vassal 
of America t• 20 and of trying to recuperate in Africa and 
Syria what she had lost to the United States. Anti-
British feelings were extended by many collaborators to 
include anti-Americanism. According to Rebatet, "the 
United States are making a joke out of England fJ • 21 The 
official collaborators, however, did their best not to an-
j 
tagonize the United States, who in 1941 put pressure on 
England to ease the blockade of Fr~c~, and who could 
easily seize France's colonial empire. When the United 
States entered the war in 1942 she became much tougher 
on Vichy, who nevertheless continued to try to appease the 
United States and avoid antagonism. 
However, among the fascist writers anti-Americanism 
was vicious. The United States, according to Brasillach 
10 
trone of the most dangerous enemies .Q1 France,,22, together 
with England, ledd France into the war and then attempted 
to do to England what England had done to France, leave 
her to do the fighting while stealing her empire. To the 
'" fascists, America was the citadel of all they hated. "Of 
130 million inhabitants in the United States, there are 
first 13 million blacks, next 8 million Jews. ,, 23 Rebatet 
wrote, ftthe enormous load of democracy is over there to-
day, with its adolescent silliness, our defects proportional 
to skyscrapers, ten ~imes more Jews, one hundred times more 
peasants".24 America was as far from France in spirit as 
it was in miles. How could the manufacturers of skyscrapers 
in series have any respect for flour cities, our villages, 
our customs, and our conception of life,,?25 Journalists 
and writers were afraid, especially after the United States 
entered the war, that an Allied victory would mean Ameri-
can dominance in Europe and that American mass culture 
would invade along with the soldiers and dollars and anni-
hilate "ancient and glorious nations u26 like France. "Amer-
ica governing Europe, what madness!,,27 
The new European order would also be able to withstand 
Soviet Russia. Before ,the war, the feeling that a strong 
Germany was the best barrier to Russia leJc~ many conserva-
tives, who previously favored a tough policy towards Ger-
many, to call for appeasement. Official and unofficial 
collaborators were overjoyed when Germany invaded the So-
viet Union. A French division of the Waffen SS, the Char-
lemagne diVision, was formed by Joseph Darnard to fight 
the Russians on the eastern front. 
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All of these reasons for choosing to work with the 
Germans, the feeling that the war was lost, that a German 
victory was really better for France than a British vic-
tory or an American or a Russian victory, that France 
could, by bargaining with the Germans, become a partner 
in a European bloc, underline the fact that collaborators, 
with very few exceptions, did not feel they were betray-
ing France or being unpatriotic. Nor were they passively 
reacting to German demands but actively taking direction 
of France's external affairs. They were serving France's 
interests in what they saw as the best way. They rightly 
foresaw that France alone was no longer a world power, 
and while they accused the resistants and Gaullists of 
being England's pawns, they themselves ended up pawns of 
Germany. Because of their misinterpretation of their ca-
pacity to deal with Germany, "Vichy was more like a 
pressed orange than like a tough nut ft • 28 Ultimately, 
Vichy was unable to preserve France's colonial empire or 
her navy or prevent the total occupation of France. 
So far collaboration has been dealt with in terms of 
its Franco-German aspect. Of equal importance, however, 
was the Fr~o-French aspect, for collaborators wanted 
more than a reordering of external affairs. Robert Pax-
ton writes: "Collaboration now meant taking advanta;ge of 
a foreign army to carry out major changes in the way French-
men were governed, schooled, and employed. n29 Especially 
in this sense, Vichy France can be seen as the continuation 
of the virtual civil war that existed in France before the 
occupation. Most collaborators, members of the anti-
Republican Right, saw the death of the Third Republic as 
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a triumph for them, and they vented their frustrations by 
blaming it for the defeat. "The disaster is only, in real-
ity, the reflection in military matters of the weaknesses 
and defects of the former political regime",30 Petain de-
clared. It was the endless struggle of coalitions of nar-
row economic interests that rendered the government weak 
and incapable of dealing with internal problems or of con-
ducting an external policy tfworthy of France JJ • 31 Not only 
was the political system indicted; Catholic Church lead-
ers saw the defeat as punishment for France's moral degen-
eracy, as evidenced by "paid vacations, pernod, strikes, 
bad films, bathing suits, democracy, and the absence of 
religion". 32 Brasillach, in his journal written in a pri-
soner of war camp in Germany, described the 1930's as a 
"period of sleep. • • but it was also one of the most ridic-
ulous periods. Never have stupidity, pedantry, bombast, 
pretension, and triumphant mediocrity been so arrogant".33 
Rebatet described France as "covered with ruins, ruins of 
things, ruins of dogmas l1 and attributed these ruins not 
to a "single and fortuitous calamity" but to a "long slip-
ping, a series of successive collapses that have accumu-
lated these enormous piles of debris". 34 ~.Q!:l ~ Peuple, 
Doriot's fascist newspaper, e_pressed strongly this hatred 
of the Third Republic in its description of Marianne de 
France, "that insolent emblem of. • • an abhored regime. • • 
infamous whore, with your Constitution of nothingness, your 
regime of social injustice, your doctrine of lies, and 
your Godless morality ff.35 
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Collaborators went beyond simply denouncing the for-
mer system. They actively attempted to rebuild France ac-
cording to their new image. After the war the Vichy not-
ables tried to gloss this over by blaming the legislation 
and actions taken by the government on German pressure. 
However, German pressure on France's internal affairs, at 
least until 1942, was practically nonexistent and it was 
in this initial period that almost all the laws wene 
passed. 36 
3efore attempting to define a general collaborationist 
mentality, it must be noted that there were wide differ-
ences in ideology and a wide variety of goals among the 
collaborators. The traditionalists, the bureaucrats, and 
the fascists all had different aims for France's recon-
struction. The traditionalists' program was the official 
"National RevolutionU , an examination of which will indi-
cate their major goals. Petain, the primary spokesman 
for Vichy and the traditionalists, replaced ULiberty, Equal-
ity, and Fraternity" with the motto "Work, Family, and 
Fatherland". This signified a political restructing 
away from democracy and the "false idea of the natural 
equality of manu37 towards a system of social hierarchy 
led by the true elites. 
Traditionalists also wanted to root out the modern 
mass culture, decadence, and anti-clericalism they saw as 
the cause of France's decline. Petain felt "a good mass 
14 
never did anyone any harm u38 and saw the strengthening of 
Catholicism as an important part of the National Revolu-
tion. Vichy France did much to ease longstanding Church-
State tensions, such as granting aid to Bishops for educa-
tional use and restoring Church property confiscated and 
not yet used. This gained Vichy the support of several 
prominent Church leaders. Pleased by this new direction, 
they also justified their support by the traditional loy-
alty of the church to . "those who legitamately hold power. u39 
Serious criticism by the Church came only in 1942 with the 
massive deportations of Jews. 
The traditional Vichy program also set out to improve 
the condition of France's youth. Petain wrote that of the 
tasks the government had to undertake, none were more im-
portant than the reform of national education. 40 The 
educational system was purged of Free Masons and Jews, and 
all teachers were required to take an oath of loyalty to 
~tain. The curriculum was restructured to include reli-
gious education and courses in good citizenship. The 
government also supported various youth groups, such as 
the Chantiers Q§ la Jeunesse, a group created by the army 
to remove draft age men from the cities and put them to 
work in the countryside. In 1942 eight months of ser-
vice in the Chantiers became mandatory for all 21-year-old 
men. 
Concern about social decadence centered-' on the de-
clining birthrate in France. To the traditionalist, the 
family was the core of French society, Uthe essential 
cell and the foundation of the social edifice",41 as Pe-
15 
tain put it. Programs were set up to strengthen the fam-
ily. Birth control had already been outlawed, so Vichy 
outlawed abortion and divorce during the first three 
years of marriage. Incentive payments were set up for 
fathers af 1 l' i..ti ,~ of large families, who were also 
rewarded with statutory seats on local committees. For 
the mothers there was the Medal of the French Family, who, 
by fltheir enlightened care, laborious activity, and their 
devotion, have made a constant effort in the best way to 
inspire in their children physical and moral hygiene, love 
of work, and the probity and care of social and patriotic 
duties".42 
The official economic program of Vichy was based on 
the traditional desire to move away from modern concen-
tration and depersonalization of agriculture and industry. 
Vichy promoted a return to the soil program in an attempt 
to rebuild family agricultural units, "the principle eco-
nomic and social base of France".43 Corporatism, a third 
way between Communism and Capitalism, was the principle 
of industrial reorganization. Ideally, employers, managers, 
and workers would organise into natural economic groupings 
by branch of industry. These corporations would govern 
themselves, thus attenuating the chaos of the free mar-
ket system, since all members would share an interest in 
their corporation. Class struggle would be eliminated. 
Just in case, Petain outlawed strikes and lock-outs and 
dissolved all workers' unions and syndicates. 
This was the public face of Vichy but underneath the 
surface, the experts, civil servants, and technicians had 
different goals in mind. They were pushing France away 
from family business, small farms, and self-regulation 
towards economic centralization and concentrated indus-
try. This was partly due to the necessity of meeting 
Germany's demands and to the scarcity of raw materials. 
The civil servants, although a conservative, highly elite 
group of men, were not traditionalists and, when freed 
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from the meddling of elected officials, administered France's 
economy as efficiently as possible. 
Opposing both the traditionalists and the bureaucrats 
was another strand of ideolpgy for rebuilding France, that 
of the fascist intellectuals and group leaders who, until 
the last months of the German occupation, never had any 
official power or influence. Their writings demonstrate 
most strongly what they were against. They were, as already 
noted, anti-communist, anti-American, and anti-British. 
They also condemned the softness, mediocrity, egoism, and 
materialism of pre-war French society and were troubleoc: 
by the decadence and decline of France. This they blamed 
partly on the dehumanization and mechanization of capital-
ism, false ideas of liberty, and the political institution 
of democracy, but they felt it was primarily due to the } 
moral and physical degradation of the people. They had 
vague ideas of economic reorganization such as the break-
ing up of trusts and monied interests. Drieu yearned for 
a return to a medieval-type guild system. Above all, 
Fascists sought the rejuvenation of France through a spir-
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itual revolution. Their vision was of an ideal manhood 
of discipline, energy, vitality, and strength, thus Brasil-
lach's concern with setting up youth organizations that 
would mold France's young men. Unlike German Nazism, French 
fascism remained elitist, believing that the country should 
be run by small groups of exceptional men, and never be-
came a mass movement. It was unable to attract support 
in a society that had not broken down to the extent that 
Germany's society had, and French fascists were never able 
to unite into one group with one leader. 
They differed from the traditionalists in that the 
ruling elite would not be drawn from the old social classes 
but from all social groups. They disliked the softness 
-/heir 
and complacency of upper class values and ~ reliance on 
i'("o.\~d 
Catholicism. While they initiall~ Vichy's reforms, they 
frequently criticized it for not going far enough fast 
enough. 
Despite this wide range 01 ideologies and goals, there 
were some common denominators that make the label "collab-
orator" viable and were central to the decision to collab,::o. 
orate. The strongest link among all collaborators was 
anti-communism. Communists always represent a threat to 
the property and standing of the old upper classes. Fas-
cists disliked the Communist materialism and emphasis on 
the economic motivation of mants actions. 
Communists were also feared because of their ties with 
Russia. Brasillach, in responding to the increase in acts 
of sabotage, said, "Mo scow alone is guilty ••• f1oscow 
wants the loss of France, wants revolution,s.44 Drieu La 
Rochelle instructed those who claimed that communism in 
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France would be a native French communism to "go ask the 
people of Bessarabia, Lithuania, or Poland if the communism 
installed by the red hordes is Bessarabian, Lithuanian, 
or Polish. It is rtussian and Russian Jewish entirely ••• ,,45 
The Communist Party itself did much to provoke this fear 
and Drieu's charge that ucommunists are French patriots 
when the Russians tell them to pretend to be n• 46 Through-
out the twenties the Communist Party remained isolated from 
French politics. In the mid-thirties, when Russian fears 
were aroused by Germany's militarism and a strong France 
seemed desirable, the Party became highly nationalistic 
and anti-fascist. The sincerity of the communists' pat-
riotism was thrown into doubt in 1939 with the signing of 
the Hitler-Stalin pact, when the party made an abrupt about-
face, refused to support the war effort, and denounced the 
war as imperialistic folly. In 1941, when Germany attacked 
Russia, the party once again switched lines and became 
highly patriotic and its members became leading partici-
pants in the Resistance. This series of changes not only 
lead the collaborationists to believe that French communists 
were Russian agents, but also caused a great deal of con-
fusion among the rank-and-file members. Marcel Giltin, 
an ex-communist, announced in ~ QE.!,-sll! Peuple that he 
left the Communist Party because of its hypocrisy and tac-
tical use of patriotism. tlWe have refused to accomplish 
so cynical an about-face. u47 To all collaborators, com-
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munism represented a horrible danger, "not only to civil-
ization, but to the well-being of each of us • • • to the 
family, the career, the fields, the factory, the shop, the 
workshop, the laboratory, the office ll • 48 
The fear of Communism was closely related to the 
second aspect of a collaborationist mentality: fear of 
sooial disorder. At the outset the Vichy officials mani-
fested this fear by deciding not to continue the fight, as 
the disorder that would have been created by oontinued war-
fare was considered a worse danger than occupation by for-
eign troops. This concern for order was a primary reason 
so many civil servants and local government officials 
stayed on the job. In 1941 Camille Vernet, the prefect 
of Tours during the German invasion of June, 1940, was hon-
ored with these words: "You-' did your duty, you stayed 
on the job, you avoided panic and maintained order in 
Tours. You have given a good example to the country.n49 
The fear of social disorder explains why, even after the 
colonies were lost, France totally occupied, the navy scut-
tled, Viohy officials stayed on the job. Laval claimed 
after the war, "Had I abandoned my post in November, 1942, 
the whole of the country would have become a vast maquis. 
The cost would have been thousands and thousands of dead. 
• • • How could the head of the Government be justified 
in making a decision which would expose the entire French 
population to this terrible risk? 1f 50 This is one reason 
that the Vichy leaders did not quit even after the war 
had turned decisively against Germany. Petain, in Nay, 
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1944, warned the population against joining the Resistance 
because it would lead to fla civil 'War which will destroy 
all that the foreign war has saved until now. • • The 
voices that preach disobedience to you are not French 
voices (and) will deliver the country to a disaster that 
all my efforts wanted it to avoid. • • Order, work, and 
union are the necessary conditions of our restoration. n51 
The government's equation of the Resistance with 
Communism and terrorism lead to the most brutal collab-
oration with German repression during the lastfwo years 
. 
of the occupation. A special mmlitia, created by Darnand, 
was used to fight the Resistance and became an instrument 
of terror and repression. In recruiting its members, it 
issued "a call to all who want to fight in its ranks, ani-
mated by the spirit of sacrifice. Its goals for the moment 
are the struggle against terrorism. u52 The fascists ap-
plauded this repression. They had previously criticized 
the government for not going far enough. Brasillach in 
1941 suggested simply shooting all the Communist leaders 
already in jail. 53 
Although there were differences in ideology among the 
Collaborators, all of them were anti-Liberals and denied 
democracy, equalIty, and liberty in exchange for order, 
hierarchy, and authority. 
Finally, all collaborators believed in purging France 
of Free Masons, who were accused of being a conspiritorial 
society. Because they were frequently socialists and anti-
clericalists, they were seen as symbolic of the hated Third 
Republic. Dislike of Free Masons was prevalent but it was 
fairly mild and manifested itself in firings of civil ser-
vants and the publishing of lists of leading citizens who 
Vlere Free !'4asons. 
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The collaborators also wanted to purge France of Jews, 
a favorite scapegoat everywhere in the interwar years. 
They were accused of subverting France's economy and of 
trying to take over the government. The French middle 
class's antisemitism was a displaced resentment of the 
larger economic forces that were crushing them. The upper 
J.ib\;~ 
classes had a traditional,,, for Jews, and among professionals 
such as doctors and lawyers Jews were hated for their 
success in these overcrowded fields. 
Antisemitism in France went beyond this economic mo-
tive, but it was different from Nazi antisemitism. Rather 
than being racial, it was primarily cultural. Jews were 
resented because they were different, a separate people 
who could not be assimilated into French culture. Vallat 
asserted that the Alibert law was written within the coun-
try's right of "protecting the national community against 
the abuses and harmful influence of a foreign element tl • 54 
~rieu, in a confused analysis of the Jewish problem, de-
fined Jews as a racial and not a religious group. How-
ever, what he disliked was their "pretention to form a 
people among each people and a people above all other 
peoples ll • 55 His solution was the gradual assimilation of 
those Jews who sincerely wished to "renounce their spe-
cificity". The rest would be put into "the ghetto to 
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which they aspire ll • 56 
French antisemitism, based on this xenophobic fear 
of "particularismff and on resentment of the control exer-
cised by Jews over the economy and government, resulted in 
laws passed in October, 1941, which defined as Jewish any-
one with Jewish grandparents, excluded Jews from all gov-
ernment service and limited the percentage of Jews in 
various professions,}lwi th the exception of World War I 
veterans. Later, the citizenship of Jews who had immi-
grated to France as early as 1930 was revoked, foreign Jews 
were rounded up into work camps, and a program of the 
f1aryanization" of Jewish enterprise, initiated by the 
Germans but followed through on by the French, took place 
in Paris. 
Laval described the laws regulating the situation of 
the Jews as "the cruellest burden which the conqueror 
obliged us to bear".57 However, Paxton claims that he was 
"unable to turn up any direct German order for French anti-
Masonic, anti-Semitic, or other legislation during the most 
active period of Vichy legislation in 1940H.58 Xavier 
Vallet, the Commissioner General for Jewish Affairs in 
1940-1942 wrote from his prison after the war, "There are 
those who believed that this law was the result of pressure 
by the occupation authorities on the French government. 
• • • The Alibert law. • • owes nothing at all to nazism 
(and was rather) spontaneous and indigenous, issued in fact 
several days before the first German ordinance. ~~59 The 
French probably would have fone no further than these laws 
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except that in 1942 the Final Solution began in the West 
and Germany set quotas for deportations from France at 
100,000. The Vichy government then participated in the 
gruesome roundup of Jews and even, in a somewhat horrify-
ing demonstration of their xenophobia, traded off foreign 
refugee Jews to save French Jews. 
One final aspect of collaboration remains, one that 
colored all the other aspects. There were those who col-
laborated out of opportunism, or the crude desire to pro-
fit from the situation. Fortunes were made by taking ad-
vantage of the aryanization of Jewish enterprise, produ-
cing for the Germans, and acting as spies and informants. 
Opportunism also tinged other forms of collaboration. The 
fascist gang leaders attempted, although unsuccessfully, 
to use collaboration as a lever to power. l The journalists 
and fascist writers used the defeat to take their re-
venge on all that had previousl~'frustrated them. While 
this aspect of collaboration can be overexaggerated, the 
official collaboration of the French government essentially 
legitamized it. The government's collaboration was a spring-
7 board for the unofficial collaborators who would not have 
had the prestige or publicity they had if not for the offi-
cial collaborators. After all, the government was basically 
using its country's defeat to accomplish certain ends, 
externally to reorder France's alliances and maintain and 
even aggrandize their colonial empire at Britain's ex-
pense, internally to reshape political,l'economic, and so-
cial institutions. 
This is important in evaluating the significance of 
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collaboration for France. On the positive side, that Vichy 
spared France the worst hardships of total occupation is 
debatable. The most that can be said is that Vichy post-
poned them. Vichy did, however, sharpen old conflicts, 
aggravate internal tensions in the face of a foreign army, 
and, because of this, helped to push the country in 1944 
into virtual civil warfare, in spite of their desire to 
avoid disorder. Vichy f s existence also led., ... France into 
complicity with actions, such as the Final Solution and 
repression of the Resistance, normally unthinkable. In 
this respect, the psychological damage done by collabora-
tion was considerable. Most of the French continue to deny 
this aspect of their past, but the sense of guilt and 
unease can still be felt. 
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Among the people in our class, we were three 
groups. Well, there were about thirty stu-
dents in the class, thus there were three 
groups of ten. There was a group really very 
collaborationist, a group frankly Gaullist, 
and then a group ••• ah ••• that waited to see 
what was going to happen. 
Dr. Chauvin 
28 
This chapter raised the problem of labeling a previously 
,,(.tili nl* 
unnamed group. I consideredl\this chapter "Neutral France u • 
However! the majority of French people were not necessarily 
neutral; they simply did not act on their beliefs, and it 
is on this basis that I distinguish them from the collabora-
tors and the resisters. Therefore, "Passive France" is the 
most accurate description of this category between the two 
extremes, this group that chose not to choose. 
It is difficult to discover exactly what the political 
opinions of this majority were, since most citizens did not 
write editorials, publish books, or give speeches. One can 
only get at their emotions and reactions through reading per-
sonal letters and journals and by talking to people who were 
there. I interviewed fifteen people in Tours, France in an 
- ~. ~ '. ' .. ... 
effort to learn more about the reactions of some of this major-
ity to the occupation. Other difficulties arose, since the 
people available for interviewing were all under thirty during 
the war, and the opinions of the older sector of the popula-
tion may have been different. Often they contradicted both 
themselves and others. The contradictions are significant 
~ ""'~~~ \~ ~~~U)71 WCAA vJV'.j;UL~~ 
both becauseAthey make ev~dent inaccuracies of th~rty-year-old 
memories, inaccuracies that are significant in that they show 
a sense of unease and guilt. Certain questions and topics 
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were met with defensiveness and edginess that may be due to 
their awareness that by not actively opposing V~chy ot the 
German Occupation, they were in a sense tacitly collaborat-
ing. Vichy could not have gone as far as it did in external 
reorientation or internal social programs had it not had a cer-
tain amount of popular consent, if not support. 
In any case, at least for the first two years after the 
defeat, many people remained in a state of somewhat stunned ap-
_a.O-?O{\'] 
athy. Analyzing~for doing something can be complex, but ana-
lyzing reasons for not doing anything presents problems all its 
own. Initially, at any rate, the shock of the defeat contrib-
uted greatly to the passivity of the people. The lightning-
quick German invasion of France in June 1940, after months of 
tense inactivity, tore up the lives of millions of French people. 
In front of the invading Germans poured a stream of refugees 
from Northern France and Belgium. At the same time, the Ger-
mans were bombing cities, shops closed as the owners hid or left, 
newspaper publishing and radio broadcasting stopped. People's 
lives were severely disoriented and they had no clear idea of 
what was happening or why. 
Since World War I, the French had been led to believe that 
their army was unsurpassed in Europe, and that the Maginot Line 
had been built as a "super trench" to ward off any invasion , ·'\ll\t. 
i/JU) \ \\CO\~{I'.~\ei ,";)1 
from the East. To be overrun in less than six weeksfito many, yet 
for most there was no desire to hold out and fight to the finish. 
The destruction and bloodletting of World War I had led to a 
strong aversion to war among the French. Most people simply 
wanted an end to the confusion and destruction and a return to 
f1normal" conditions, as Narcel Verdier expressed in The Sorrow 
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and the Pity: "Like all the other forty million Frenchmen who 
lived through that particular day when I saw our Army routed, 
when I saw that the Germans were in Biarritz and that the whole 
of France was invaded, and that nothing was to be done about it, 
well, I felt as all the others did: there must be someone who 
can stop this massacre. u1 In Tours, concern over stopping the 
destruction led to a decision by the mayor to declare Tours an 
open city to the Germans without having received orders from the 
~£ench government to do so. The French were humiliated by the de-
feat, a mood captured by Simone de Beauvoirts description of her 
journey back to Paris after the armistice had been signed. "It 
was absolutely hellish. Victory was written across every German 
face while every French face proclaimed defeat aloud. tt2 Yet they, 
as did the government, preferred to accept defeat than to con-
tinue fighting. 
They were given a symbol to soothe their fears, Philippe 
Petain, the "victor of Verdun", a war hero who promised to 
help France regain her position externally and renew herself 
internally. Roger Tounze, a newspaperman in Clermont-Ferrand, 
spoke of the effect Petain had on the French. \lWell, at the 
beginning I did not understand anything, just like every-
body else. On June twenty-fourth, in the morning, the lieu-
tenant gave a beautiful speech, and then Marshal P€tain, the 
only marshal we had, sued for an armistice. I knew what an 
armistice was, but I did not fully realize what a marshal 
was. n3 The caring father image was emphasized by Petain 
himself. " (1941) should be the year of France's recovery. 
It will be if all of you press yourselves close to me. 
• • • I have given 
myself to France, that is to say, to all of you. n4 
Support for Petain, especially in the first years, 
was widespread. Dr. Chauvin, a high school student in 
Tours, spoke of the political divisions among his class-
mates. "There were not many collaborators. On the 
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other hand, there were partisans of IVlarshal Petruin, many 
more than collaborators. In our class, out of ten who 
were for P~tain, there were really only two or three 
collaborators, that's all. tl5 This attitude not only shows 
that wide support for ~tain existed but that it was not 
considered collaborationist. Most of my interviewees 
either did not realize or could not believe that support-
ing a regime that collaborated with Germany was, in a 
sense, collaborating. In any case, Vichy seemed legiti-
mate. The Chamber of Deputies had voted full powers to 
P~tain, and, as L'Abbe Labaume explained, Jlcertain emmi-
nent jurists thought that Marshal Petain's power was 
legitimate, and other emminent jurists ••• asserted that 
the Marshal Petain was illegitimate in this government. 
So how were we to decide?U6 How were ordinary citizens 
to decide this? My impression is that they did not de-
cide; they simply accepted what existed. Madame Solange, 
in The Sorrow and the Pity, admitted she was petainiste. 
ttl was for the J.l.1arshal, I don t t know. I wasn't political. " 
When asked what her support stemmed from she replied, 
"Well, ma,be it was the Marshal's ideas. • • what he wanted 
to do for France. And I thought he was a very fine man."? 
Petain was a symbol of France's days of glory, a 
father figure, someone people would trust with France's 
destiny. Support for the Vichy regime was also urged 
by the Church. Archbishop Fellin of Bordeaux, in June, 
1940, urged the French, "Be thus united around our flag 
in mourning. • • and under the authority of those. who le-
gitimately hold power. uS In spite of the decline of Ca-
tholicism in twentieth-century France, it still was a 
significant social force. The Church's support of Vichy 
thus gave it moral legitimacy and for this reason it is 
significant that the Archbishop of Tours accompanied the 
mayor and the prefect to surrender to the Germans. When 
I asked L'Abbe Labaume, himself a resistor, about the 
role of the Archbishop in Tours, he answered that "they 
(the archbishops) had a people to support, to animate, 
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to protect also, you see. An imprudent action on their 
part brought on serious consequences; thus it was neces-
sary for one thing that they be very prudent.,,9 
There was also, especially during and after the in-
vasion, a revival of religiosity. Some Catholics inter-
preted the defeat and occupation as punishment for France's 
sins. Archbishop Fellin felt that ttif we have been con-
quered, it is maybe that we were no longer sufficiently 
supported at the bottom of our souls by this triple ideal 
which is three large realities: God, the Fatherland, the 
Family".10 The increase in religiosity led to the publish-
ing of a collection of 322 invocations to saints according 
to the nature of the demand made. Pilgrimage spots such 
as Lourdes were crowded. Another interesting phenomenon 
took place in 1943, Le Grand Retour. The statue of Notre 
Dame of Boulogne was smuggled across the demarcation line 
in a truck and brought to Lourdes. It then was brought 
by missionaries from village to village, while pilgrims 
consecrated themselves with a sign of penance. "Our Lady 
of Sorrow, pray for France who suffers; Our Lady of 
Sorrow, pray for France who has sinned.,,11 1/Uring this 
expedition, over five million souvenir pictures and one 
and a half million rosaries were sold. 12 
The majority of the people were passive for another 
important reason. France was being occupied, directly in 
the North, by a foreign army. Attitudes towards Germany 
and the Germans were confused. In 1940 Germany seemed 
invincible. England was the only country left opposing 
Germany, and faith in her ability to hold out was poor. 
Lack of hope combined with the shock of the defeat kept 
people from actively opposing the Germans. Dr. Chauvin, 
a student in Tours, felt that "anyway, there some very 
difficult moments because ••• Germany was a very solid 
country • • • people had to have a certain kind of admira-
tion because it was, even so, a very well organized, very 
disciplined, very solid country.n13 However, he did not 
think at the time "that it was allover, that we had the 
Germans on our backs forever, not that, no!ff 14 When I 
asked Madame Fournier, a secretary, if it seemed in 1940 
as if the Germans were there to stay, she responded, "Oh, 
no, we always thought they would leave, and as soon as 
possible and right away. We never thought it would last 
five years • • • We always had the hope that they would 
leave, that they would leave. That's why we still had 
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the courage to live. u 15 Although they never lost hope 
that the Germans would leave, they never saw themselves 
personally as having anything to do with getting r[d of 
the Germans. Mr. Martin, who worked as a typesetter at 
the local paper in Tours, illustrated this passive wait-
ing for someone to come liberate France. "We had this 
idea that we were going to be liberated, that one day the 
war would be over, but in what way? ••• We didn't know 
how we could get out of it because we didn't quite see 
how they would be able to make a landing. u16 
Doubtless, another reason why few direct anti-German 
actions were taken, although the French people wanted 
the Germans out and did not lose hope that they would 
leave, was simply fear of the Germans. In 1940, there 
was never any question that northern France was being 
occupied, whiah the first paper to appear in Tours after 
the armistice made very clear. All cars, trucks, and 
firearms were requisitioned, there was a curfew from 
8:00 PM to 6:00 AM and a total blackout after dark, 
there was no drawing, sketching, or photographing in the 
streets without express permission of the German Comman-
dant, no listening to the radio or singing in the streets 
or in homes, no gatherings of more than two in the streets. 
Even the clocks were all reset to German time. Iv1adame 
X, who asked that her name not be used, felt that nit was 
always very painful to see this German constraint over 
our lives. This is what those who have never been occu-
pied can never comprehend • • • All the same we spent four 
17 years under the German boot." Madame Fournier, a sec-
retary, also commented on the constant fear inspired by 
the parading soldiers. nAnd when we saw a German, we 
were always afraid of him, we trembled. u18 
However, talk of fear of the Germans may have been a 
rationalization. Madame Fournier, who trembled at the 
sight of a German, worked in an office run by Germans. 
When I asked her about this, she became quite agitated. 
nYes, but there the Germans were everywhere, they were 
in the administration, in the mayorts office ••• they 
were the ones who commanded, sure • • • they were the 
ones who were in charge of everything • • • there was the 
army, there were the civilians ••• You see, they were 
the leaders, so we were forced to be under their domina-
tion and to work with them.,,19 Madame X said she and 
her husband were called collaborators by their neighbors 
because they had housed a German officer. I asked her 
if she considered herself a collaborator. "Absolutely 
not ! We didnft consider ourselves collaborators. You 
couldn't close your house to the Germans. It was abso-
lutely necessary to receive them. It was okay to shoot 
the Germans in the back, but norto oppose them face to 
face like that. We couldn't do that at all, at all, at 
all! fl 20 Dr. Chauvin also expressed the belief that they 
could not directly oppose the Germans. "They had force. 
They arrested people and deported people to Germany • • • 
What could you do against that? Organize clandestinely, 
okay, but direct action against the Germans, no! It was 
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not possible. ,,21 
One scene in The Sorrow and the Pity illustrates that 
sometimes this fear was not based on an actual threat or 
risk. M. Dionnet was a schoolteacher in Clermont-Ferrand. 
Dionnet: People came to this flag-
raising ceremony against their will, you 
understand. It was a • • • 
But they came anyway? 
Dionnet: Well, they had to, in times 
like that. You begin to realize • • • you 
understand what people are really like, 
you know, how fear prevails, with very few 
exceptions. 
Did they actually run any risk for 
not attending? 
Dionnet: No, but they thought they 
did. 22 
The presence of Germans and the restrictions they 
imposed were objective reasons for fear. Yet the over-
reaction of the interviewees to my questions, their con-
stant insistence on having to work with the Germans or 
else be arrested, on having been forced to obey, gave me 
the impression that this fear was a kind of self-justifi-
cation for not having done anything. This impression is 
furthered by the fact that in 1940 through -j 942 the Ger-
mans were not particularly harsh in Tours, as my inter-
viewees themselves admit. Mr. Martin, a typesetter, 
stated that at first, "outside of the curfew, let's say 
that life was relatively ••• normal, that is for a time of 
war. u 23 A prefect report for the Eure Department, wri t-
ten in 1940, claimed that t1in spite of all this (the ma-
terial destrQction) the state of mind of the population 
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in general is excellent and its rapports with the occupiers 
are marked by dignity and correctness. No incidents have 
been signaled to me and I must recognize that a very strict 
discipline appears to have been imposed on the German 
troops. ,,24 
The people I spoke with seemed to respect the Germans 
they knew personally. Occasionally I was l~ft completely 
bewildered by the abruptness of the change in tone. Af-
ter her long tirade about being under German domination 
and being forced to work with the Germans, Madame Four-
nier told me, "But they were reasonable, those who occu-
pied the offices. They were reasonable. They weren't 
mean, they weren't severe, they weren't so terrible. 
Things went pretty smoothly,tf 25 Perhaps the reality it-
self was contradictory - the fear created by parading 
soldiers, restrictions, and arrests on the one side and 
the basic humanity seen with one-to-one contact on the 
other. Madame Guinvarch, whose husband was a policeman 
in Tours, told me of the day she was out walking with her 
baby in a carriage when a German soldier stopped her, 
picked up and embraced the child, then explained that he 
had just received news that his wife and children had 
been killed in a bombing. "But really, the Germans, you 
couldn't say they hated us. They were our friends.,,26 
Alongside this humanity was a deep respect for the "cor-
rectness·1 and politeness of the Germans. The French (Y\id~le.. class 
valuef the formalities of politeness highly, and the 
Germans were praised for being "clean, impeccable, al-
ways very polite,n27 as Madame Fournier described them. 
f'ladame X referred to the (ferman officer quartered at their 
house as "our German(l and said, "He was a very correct 
man, very nice, indeed very much like us".28 The June 
23, -1940, entry in Mr. Chollet's journal of the events 
of the German invasion illustrated this admiration with 
the discomfort it brought. Hr. Chollet was approached 
by a German who asked him, "in a most correct French and 
a very courteous tone of voice, where he would be able 
to procure a guide to Franco-German conversation. I in-
dicated the address of a bookstore. While he transcribed 
it in his notebook, I complimented him for the manner in 
which he expressed himself in our language. • • pushing 
politeness to the fullest, he thanked me in excellent 
terms and extended his hand. I avoided his gesture with 
a curt military salute, which seemed to disconcert him. 
He did not insist and turned away, his hand to his cap.tt29 
Correct French and politeness on the one hand and force 
and power on the other created this peculiar mixture of 
fear and respect. 
Attitudes towards the Germans shifted noticeably 
after 1942, for a combination of reasons. First, as 
Mr. Martin explained, "as the years passed, we realized 
that first of all life was becoming more and more diffi-
cult fl • 30 Conditions did worsen; shortages of food, elec-
tricity, and fuel became quite severe. rtoger Martin du 
Gard wrote to Andre Gide in September, 1942, "Itm not 
writing to you to w4ine about the food situation. All 
the same, things have reached such a point, in a region, 
that it must be talked about. Three and four days in a 
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row have passed where there has been nothipg in the mar-
kets. I say nothing literally. Not ~ single vegetable, 
not § single fruit ••• There are entire families who 
have nothing more than their bread rations to eat every 
day.n31 The Germans also became harsher with the French. 
In November, 1942, all of France was directly occupied. 
That year also saw the start of massive Jewish deporta-
tions from France, and in 1943 compulsory labor was in-
stituted. The increase in German severity toward the 
French is also noticeable in these figures from the Indre-




Deported32 Year Arrested to death Interned 
1940 22 0 20 2 
';941 136 1 106 29 
1942 519 30 195 354 
1943 584 12 215 364 
1944 604 33 125 446 
indet. ..J.i t 0 14 
total '1944 76 m 1207 
The reasons for this increase were partly external. 
Mr. Martin explained that illife became more difficult 
from the time that the Germans felt that for them, if 
you like, the game was up. And then, when they had the 
Russian front, that gave them a~ot of trouble. In every 
corner they felt a little bit ••• like they were losing 
ground ••• and they took it out on the countries where 
they had installed themselves. tl33 In June, 1941, a pre-
fect report for the Eure Department made note of the 
ftimmense hope (of those who only live in the hope and in 
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anticipation of a return to the previous state of affairs) 
at the news that Russia in turn has entered into the 
struggle n • 34 Although, like the collaborators, many of 
those who remained passive feared a Russian victory as 
the triumph of Communism, still Russia's entry signalled 
the beginning of the end for Germany. The report also 
examined the population's response to English aggression 
in Syria. At first it created anger and confusion but 
quickly things settled down. "The entrance of General 
de Gaulle in Beyreuth will certainly be saluted in my 
district by an explosion of joy ••• controlled.,,35 As the 
tide turned against Germany hopes were raised, "especially 
from the time Russia entered the war • • • We thought that 
the same thing would happen to Hitler that had happened 
to Napoleon. And after, when America entered the war, 
well then ••• ,, 36 With the possibility that Germany could 
be defeated, more people entered the resistance, which, 
although still a minority, became increasingly militant, 
which in turn led to increasing harshness by the Germans, 
and so on. By 1943 opinion had shifted decisively 
towards the Allies, yet there was still n~ real threat 
to the Germans. 
The majority remained passive, not only due to fear 
of the Germans, but also due to a preoccupation with 
their own and their families' survival. Just getting 
by from day to day was a chore that required a great deal 
of time and energy. Everyone I spoke to agreed on the 
primary concern: 
Dr. Chauvin: tlOh, yes, that was it, the number one 
preoccupation, eating, because really, we were very hun-
gry. We were very thin. u37 
Mme Fournier: "That which we missed principally 
was food. It's really the hardest thing to do without, 
isn't it? We didn't have much to eat. tt38 
Mme X: "The deprivation that was really something 
was the deprivation of food. n39 
"What was the main preoccupation of people at that 
time, according to you?' . 
Marcel Verdier: uFood, food!,,40 
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Food shortage, the result of the loss of 700,000 
French peasants to German POW camps, poor distribution, 
hoarding, and German requisitions, became a serious prob-
lem. Paxton writes that "France eventually was the worst 
nourished of the Western occupied nations,,41 and esti-
mated caloric intake to have "descended as low as 1500 
calories a day where there was access to black market 
supplies and even lower for city populations where there 
was not tt • 42 Thus, simply getting enough food was a com-
plex, tiring process which involved knowing which tickets 
were good on what day and getting up early and standing 
for hours in lines. The French often tried to augment 
their legal ration, frequently by riding out to the country-
side, to the farm of a friend or relative, and buying 
produce directly from them. A black market also developed 
which involved selling restricted food at exorbitant 
prices of selling ration tickets. For this Alfred Fabre-
42 
Luce described the Frenchman as a "losing profiteer • • • 
He diminishes his own ration by trying to better it. 
Forty million resourceful ones are proud of having played 
tricks on each other. n43 
Those who , had access to food, shopk~epers in par-
ticular, hoarded all they could. Jean Dutourd, in his 
novel Au Bon Beurre, describes a middle class shopkeeper 
family that owned a cremery and profited so well from 
black market buying and selling, watering down the milk 
and cream, and so on, that they ate huge meals out of 
spite. They now had power over the people they supposedly 
served. Although Au Bon Beurre is fiction, a prefect 
report for 1942 also described this phenomenon. "Those 
who do not need to fear material difficulties because, 
really, they are making profits off of the economic dts-
order, reveal a scorn for all morality • • • The merchant, 
the entrepeneur who enriches himself by means of the occu-
pation, desires a life that corresponds to his gains. 
This one here does not steal, he traffics • • • He is 
lavish and buys all that is sold.,,44. 
Food was not the only item in short supply. Cigar-
ettes, oil, coal, electricity, and so on, were also 
rationed. Buying a new pair of shoes required an appli-
cation. The French often displayed ingenuity in getting 
by without these items. Old garden hoses were used as 
bicycle tires, a necessary vehicle because there were no 
cars. Homemade butter churns were constructed to con-
vert some of the milk ration to butter. A product called 
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Filpas was sold to replace stockings. The women painted 
it on their legs to give the appearance of nylon. The 
variety of plants that were dried and smoked to augment 
the "decade" (ten days worth) of cigarettes gives credit 
to the French imagination - anything from corn silk and 
rose leaves to artichokes. Old clothes were repaired 
",. A • 
rather than replaced, and La Depeche ~n Tours printed 
an article about new fabrics that were designed. 
This summer, clothes made of vegetable 
fabric will be worn. Dresses or suits 
of woml or cotton will be as rare as 
they will be out of style ••• These new 
fabrics are not unpleasant. They are 
soft to the touch, supple, and hold 
up well ••• So goes the mode. Late com-
ers will risk wearing an old-fashioned 
kind of fabric, ana5to be "a la modell, 
what won't one do. 
Thus, simple daily life was no longer simple but a 
source of constant worry. People were physically uncom-
fortable, hungry, and cold, but their frustrations affec-
ted them on a deeper, internal level. Madame X described 
it as "something that is quite spiritual, but that is a 
part of the most important part of our ideas, of our dis-
positionstt. 46 This constant anxiety helps explain a phe-
nomenon most difficult to understand, denunciations. 
Baudot described those who wrote letters of denunciation 
as limen and women pushed by hatred an¢! by vengeance or 
again by the lure of pay for treason".47 While hatred 
'and vengeance did playa role, this explanation is too 
simplistic to satisfy me. It makes it easy to categorize 
those who denounced as spiteful or greedy, not like the 
rest of them. Dr. Chauvin was allowed to look over the 
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letters of denunciation in the archives of Tours. Most 
often they were written "for stupid reasons ••• People 
wrote to the Germans to denounce their neighbors who had 
badly camouflaged their lights. ,,48 Baudot also mentions 
that the Germans paid little attention to these letters, 
and threw them out or handed them over to French author-
ities. That there were so many of such minor importance 
that the Germans simply threw them out indicates a more 
complex motivation. They were a manifestation of the 
constant stress and tremendous anxiety produced by the 
difficulties of life, by fear of the Germans, and perhaps 
by a sense of unease that they were not doing anything. 
Writing a letter could have been a way of taking out 
these feelings and of performing an action that, while 
no d:ik 
it incurre~, masked self-concern as the concern of a good 
French citizen. (If the person next door does not cam-
ouflage his lights, we may all be killed by a bomb.) 
This tension and anxiety also had its lighter mani-
festations. If the French did nothing else, they did 
make fun of themselves and everyone else, as in this joke 
which compares the behavior of parachutists of various 
nationalities. 
The Germans jump from the plane at 
the first command: flHeraus! n. 
The English start by taking their 
tea and marmalade, smoking a cigarette, 
and then deciding to jump for the King, 
for His Gracious Majesty ••• 
The Italians calmly throw their para-
chutes into the empty space and don't 
follow them. 
The French complain: flIt's always 
the same ones who get themselves killed • 
• • • Isn't a shame to nominate fathers 
for such a job! " Finally, under the 
insistence of the officer, who calls 
on their sense of honor, they jumP.49 
But they don't have parachutes. 
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This joke could have been inspired by the situation in 
1940: the Germans who attacked quickly, the English, who 
reacted slowly and calmly, the Italians, who entered in 
word but not in action, and the French, who entered re-
luctantly only to find themselves unprepared. 
Jokes are an excellent indication of the concerns 
and preoccupations of the population. They were also a 
form of defense against demoralization and despair, a form 
of resistance, although still passive resistance, to prop-
aeanda, and offered a release of tension. The most fre-
quent jokes were about the food situation, rationing, 
shortages, and lines. Even Le Cri du Peuple, a fascist 
newspaper, carried cartoons mocking the situation, but 
they were usually pretty poor humor. For example, a mother 
was shown talking to her daughter, saying, fllf you had 
accepted the owner of the spice store on the corner's 
proposal of marriage, now I wouldn't have to stand in line. ,,50 
A street joke about lines was somewhat more sarcastic. 
A man to a pregnant woman: 
"Vous l'avez eu sans ticket? " 
Woman's response: 
tlOui, mais quelle queue! ,,51 
An extended joke about rationing was Marcel Ayme's The -
Life Ration (extracts from the diary of Jules Flegmon). 
It mocks the government's moralizing tone in its efforts 
to ration. "In order to avoid the risk of serious shor-
tages, and to ensure a high margin of productivity, the 
Government • • • intends to abolish all unproductive and 
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useless elements in the population • • • Of course there 
is no question of actually putting useless mouths to 
death. The idea is simply to ration their living time. 
They're to be entitled to so many days of existence a 
month. tt52 The Life Rati.Q!!. also makes fun of the justifi-
cation of black market buying and the extremes to which 
it is carried. People do not simply buy enough days to 
, 
make up a month but exorbitant amounts if they can afford 
bov,<\l\f" b\o,\:,k rro{"\:~t 
it, such as a man who 1,967 days in one month. Eventu-
,I' " 
ally the situation reaches the point that life cards are 
abolished. 
Jokes about Germans were also common. Many of them 
compensate for the inner sense of humiliation felt by 
the French by showing a subtly superior Frenchman making 
a fool out of a dumb German, as in this joke: 
Every morning a Fritz bought his paper 
from the same merchant who, knowing 
that he didn't know our language, said 
to him with a big smile: "'Ile11, here 
it is, your daily, grand con!U 
The German inquired as to the mean-
ing of this word from a Frenchman who 
explained to him, "Grand con is the fa-
miliar diminutive for Grand Conqueror." 
The next day the German responded 
to the merchant, "No, not grand can, me 
Ii ttle £.Q!! ••• It and add.ed with a liig§ 
arm salute, lfHitler, him grand con!" 3 
'" As for the National Revolution, npetain preaches to us 
a return to the soil. At 85 years of age he could well 
indeed give the example. u54 
Up to now I have examined various motives for the 
lack of action, such as respect for Petain, religiosity, 
fear of the Germans, and preoccupation with survival. 
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The simplest explanation should not be forgotten. Not 
doing anything was the easiest thing to do. Conditions 
were bad, but not bad enough to push people over the 
border of inertia. There was a basic political apathy. 
The issues were complex and often people acted without 
thinking issues through to their conclusions o~ consider-
ing the larger perspective into which their actions fit. 
Roger Tounze, a newspaperman in Clermont-Ferrand, when 
he found out that a Jewish friend of his had been dis-
missed, "began to get angry, to rebel; (he) started ask-
ing some questions • • • ,,55 Most of the French did not 
ask themselves questions, as in the case of Marius Klein, 
who did not rebel against the persecution 'of Jewish shop-
keepers but placed an ad in the paper stating that he was 
not Jewish so that he would not get hurt by it. 56 
Not thinking through questions was reinforced by 
what was central motive for remaining passive. Many French 
did not see or did not allow themselves to see alterna-
tives. They felt "so isolated, so powerless",57 as Si-
mone de Beauvoir responded to Sartre's insistence that 
they act. Their daily lives were difficult and usually 
preoccupied them and kept them from facing a direct con-
frontation with difficult issues. Yet they usually proved 
passive when confrontations did arise. Madame Guinvarch's 
husband was a policeman in Tours during the war, and the 
French police were responsible for arresting Jews and re-
sistors. When I asked Madame Guinvarch what her husband 
did with the French police, she answered, 
Oh, yes, they were obliged to be 
police. Often, when a policeman was 
told such-and-such a person will be 
arrested tomorrow morning he tried to 
warn this person ••• Sometimes they were 
too late. The second time, the po-
liceman was forced to ••• how shall I 
say? •• 
She then trailed off and switched back to: 
Besides, the French police were under 
the control of the German police. 
They were under their control, but58 
they really worked for the French. 
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Mr. Guinvarch thought of secretly warning people who were 
to be arrested, but did not consider or rejected the option 
of refusing, resigning, or joining the resistance. As 
with most people in this category, the risk was too high. 
In this case a wife and children depended on his income. 
This was also true of Mr. Martin, who was drafted into 
the forced labor program to work in Germany. At this 
point many young Frenchmen joined the resistance rather 
than work in Germany, but Mr. Martin had a wife and a 
child on the way. Politically, his feelings were not 
strong one way or the other. He did not mind the work 
in Germany as he ended up with an easy job at the post 
office. Six months later he was given permission to re-
turn to France to see his daughter, at which point he 
"arranged" to be able to stay, but from the way he talked 
it seemed to be more for the sake of convenience than 
from any aversion to working for the Germans. 
This blindness to alternatives is also illustrated 
in the scene from The Sorrow and the Pity where two school-
teachers discuss the dismissal of a Jewish colleague •. 
M. Danton: Well, if I may add a word, 
take the case of Never. I think we 
tried to find him some private tutor-
ing. The same went for another col-
league who had been dismissed. But 
as you say, it wasn't much; but still 
I think there was some sympathy. Yes, 
there was. 
When you say, ffWhat could we do'?", 
what do you mean'? Ultimately, you 
could have offered a collective resig-
nation from the ltoei' couldn't you'? 
M. Dionnet: We 1, that was out 
of the question. You don*t have any 
understanding of ~eachers ••• collec- 59 
tive resignation, come on,.! 
The risk of such alternatives was too high. Most 
people lost materially less by accepting the situation 
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with its lesser unpleasantness. However, they did 10S6 
self-respect as they ended up making choices they would 
have preferred not to make. In any similar situation the 
majority of people can well be expected to act this way. 
The motives of protecting one's life and family, and avoid-
ing arrest]at times like that, challenges in themselves, 
are certainly not uniquely French. It takes a tremendous 
push to overcome most peoples' desire to live their lives 
normally and leave political matters aside. The larger 
questions were distant and difficult to perceive in their 
proper perspective at the time, and matters were confused 
by the existence of a French state that called on the 
people to return to normal and accept the occupation. 
When confronted individually with a choice, by being re-
quisitioned for forced labor or being called upon to 
arrest a compatriot, many chose to remain passive, not 
because they were pro-German, but because they had not 
thought out the ultimate consequences of their actions, 
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or at least their sense of responsibility to themselves 
took priority over any sense of collective responsibility 
for France. It is this which explains the sense of guilt 
and unease, the defensiveness I encountered, and the 
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Chapter Three 
The Resistance 
From the very start the Resistance was 
a question of outlook, even more, of 
character ••• The Resistance was faithful 
to all the great principles for which 
men have lived and, when necessary, 




The choices open to the French people obviously were 
not limited to collaboration or passivity. Resistance, 
and by this I mean active opposition to the German Occu-
piers and the French collaborators, was a third option. 
Resisters were members of mpvements or networks that com-
mitted acts of sabotage and guerilla warfare, wrote and 
distributed underground tracts and newspapers, helped 
escapees, gathered information for the Allies, etc •••. The 
Resistance was both an external and an internal phenomenon. 
Externally, it was launched by General Charles de Gaulle 
on June 18, 1940, two days after Petain had asked the 
Germans for an Armistice, with a now legendary radio an-
nouncement. 
I, General de Gaulle, now 1n London, 
calIon all French officers and men 
who are at present on British soil, 
or may be in the future, with or with-
out arms; I calIon all engineers and 
workmen from the armaments factories 
who are at present on British soil, or 
may be in the future, to get in touch 
with me. 
Whatever happens, the flame of 
French resistance must not and shal1 1 not die. 
The movement he launched, called the Free French, con-
sisted primarily of military men, sailors and soldiers 
from Dunkirk and members of the colonial administration 
whose fidelity to de Gaulle was complete. Being career 
soldiers, they had an inaptitude for and a distrust of 
clandestine warfare and tended to seethe struggle in 
terms of traditional armies. They were wary also of 
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the revolutionary effervescence of the internal Resis-
tance. Within France the Resistance, like collaboration, 
was hardly a monolithic movement. Groups and networks 
formed and reformed, were broken up by loss of members. 
It was rare that a particular network survived all four 
years or that a movement operated in both zones at the 
same time. Because of the need for secrecy, often groups 
were not even aware of each other. The activities of 
these diverse groups fell into three basic categories. 
Direct anti-German action involved sabotage, assassina-
tion, cutting telephone wires, and other semi-military 
measures. Aiding de Gau~e involved transmitting infor-
mation on the Germans to London, printing false papers, 
setting up routes for crossing the demarcation line or 
the English Channel. Finally, writing tracts for news-
papers or posters was a way of counteracting the constant 
Vichy propaganda • 
.:r..n ..J~ fJor1itf(\ 'lD()e-Hvu-~ \,\9Qrc t:OIj{' fr dYlafl (YIDVUt'leJ)15 . 
~The Liberation-~, formed by socialists and syn-
dicalists, put out a paper and worked with de Gaulle, as 
did the ~ de !s Resistance, whose members tended to-
wards the political right. The Organization Civile et 
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Militaire was made up of soldiers and civil servants who 
placed themselves in important administrative posts where 
they were able to gather information useful to the Allies. 
The Front Nationale, which consisted of the reserves of 
the Communist Party, was the only movement both political 
and military that worked simultaneously in both zones. 
Alongside these were several smaller groups of students 
and intellectuals. These smaller groups usually did not 
last long because they were either decimated by the Ger-
mans or swallowed into larger movements. 
In the South the major movements were: Combat, a 
group of officers, engineers, and bureaucrats, usually 
Christian Democrats, who gathered information and wrote 
tracts, Liberation-~, a group of syndicalists, social-
ists, and communists who centered their writings on anti-
fascism and worked at mobilizing the masses, which they 
reproached Combat, a more elitist group, for ignoring, 
and Franc-Tireur, a group of intellectuals, ~lh:s l.ren, mostly 
Communists) who at first only published a newspaper, then 
became an organized sabotage group that worked with de 
Gaulle.and the Allies in London. 
Although there were a large number of movements, 
Henri Michel advises us not to be misle/d. "Active 11.e-
sisters were never more than a minority and at the start 
a tiny minority.n 2 Often one person had a multitude of 
pseudonyms, which also gave a misleading impression of 
numbers. It is difficult to pin down the exact numbers 
for the Resistance. Paxton figures that "after the war 
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some 300,000 Frenchmen received official veteran's status 
for active Resistance service: 130,000 as deportees and 
another 170,000 as ' Resistance volunteers;· This brings 
the total of active aesistance participation at its peak, 
at least as officia~/recognized after the war, to about 
two percent of the adult French population. tl3 Bre'e and 
Bernauer claim that 30,000 Resisters were executed and 
115,000 deported, whereas Nichel wrote that 20,000 were 
shot and ',00,000 deported. In any case the numbers dis-
prove the "myth of the Resistance", a myth created after 
the war as a kind of collective white lie to ease con-
sciences. Since the Hesisters proved to be the IIgood 
guys" on the right, or winning, side, many who did not 
resist, even if they did not collaborate, did not wish 
to admit that they had had neither the foresight nor the 
courage to resist. They have rewritten their personal 
and national past until it would appear as if everyone 
lead a double life and the Resistance was a mass move-
mente Emile Couladon, called Colonel Gaspar while serving 
as the head of the Auvergne maquis, remarked with frus-
tration, "The thing which amazes me most when I talk to 
people who I know very well supported Petain is • • • 
they all tell me how they did their share for the Resis-
tance. They've all done one thing or another, there's 
always something they can think of ••• Sometimes it's 
quite incredible: 'Well, if you only knew, Monsieur Gas-
par, if I told you what I did ••• ' And so I say: out 
with it, corne on , tell me, tell me all about it."4 
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The question of why so few people resisted has been 
dealt with in the first two chapters. The question now 
is, why did anyone at all resist? The risks were incred-
ibly high, taking Paxtonis figures - over half of the 
Resisters either lost their lives or were deported. What 
types of people were willing to take these risks and what 
motivated them? The ltesisters were, as were the collab-
orators, shaped by their prewar experiences. Chapter 
One described the division of France during the 1930's 
into two opposing camps, the conservatives and the fas-
cists on one side and a left wing coalition called the 
Popular Front on the other. Tensions erupted during the 
Depression into a virtual civil war, and when Petain took 
over in 1940, a large body of the population disillusioned 
\IIli th the Third Republic proved ready to follow him. Jean 
Gu€henno sensed the role this prewar split played in ",940. 
The defeat of France is only one episode 
of the European Civil War. Beneath the 
conflict between nations lies a deeper 
social conflict. Each nation is so sharp-
ly divided within itself that some one 
of the parties that compose it can think 
that their country's loss is their gain. 
Thus, for some groups of Frenchmen, the 
misfortune of France is such a victory 
as they had no longer dared to hope for. 
The Republic had lost; therefore, they 5 
have won. 
In the same way the prewar split paved the path tOJresis-
tance for some political groups. Certain members of the 
Popular Front, socialists such as Leon Blum, had already 
come around to accepting the idea that pacifism in cer-
tain cases would have to be sacrificed and that the threat 
of fascism warranted a fight. After the Armistice labor 
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unions were outlawed and their members suddenly found 
themselves members of illegal organizations forced under-
ground to continue. These clandestine labor organizations 
proved to be a large and important part of the Resis-
tance. The Communists, for different reasons, followed 
a similar but more round-about path, from joining the 
Popular Front and calling for a firm stand against fas-
cism in 1935 to denouncing the war as an imperialistic 
conflict in 1939 (in response to which Prime Minister 
Daladier declared them illegal and forced them underground) 
and eventually, with the German invasion of the Soviet 
Union in 1941, to joining the Resistance in full strength. 
While they were late in joining, they soon took over the 
initiative in direct anti~German activities and they lost 
the highest percentage of their members to execution and 
deportation. 
A large number of those who resisted had been forced 
underground and were already outcasts of society. They 
had less to lose by resisting than did the better~off 
members of society. Emmanuel dtAstier de la Vigerie, 
creator of the movement Liberation-Sud, explained, 
I'm going to say something nasty about 
my friends and myself: I think you 
could only have joined the Resistance 
if you were maladjusted ••• lt's impos-
sible to imagine a government minister, 
or a colonel, or an executive becoming 
a real partisan, a resister; if they're 
successful in their lives, then they'll 
be equally successful in dealing with 6 
Germans or Englishmen or Russians. 
People with less of a stake in society resisted, including 
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a large number of workers. Denis Rake, a British secret 
agent in ?rance during the war, remembered that 
the greatest help I received came from 
railroad workers and Oommunists. French 
workers were terrific, they would do any-
thing, they would give you their last 
penny if you had no money ••• But the mid-
dle class was scared. Of course they 
had more to lose and I think in life one 
takes into account what one has to lose -
I had no relatives, I wasn't married. 
That's why I did that kind of work - what 7 
difference did it make after all? 
Along with the workers, Communists, socialists, and 
syndicalists, the Resistance included a "particularly high 
proportion of France's intellectuals and men of letters " .8 
Left-wing intellectuals like Jean-Paul Sartre, Jean Gu~­
henno, and Louis Aragon felt called upon to act according 
to their philosophies. There were several movements which 
consisted of university students, such as Defense ~ !§ 
France and the Musee de l'Homme, a group created by sev-
eral young ethnologists, most of whom eventually gave up 
their lives. Henri Michel saw this among the long-term 
contributions of the .ii.esistance, that it "asserted and 
revealed the quality of character in those Frenchmen pre-
viously inclined to intellectualism at the Rxpense of 
practical activity".9 
As the war continued, the composition of the Resis-
tance changed and expanded to include new outcasts created 
by the imposition of the Service de Travail Obligatoire, 
a program of forced labor in Germany. Michel explains 
this flood of recruits as men who had been too young in 
1940 to make a choice. I tend to see them as men who 
before 1943 had not been forced to make a choice. In any 
case, by March, 1944, an estimated 35,000 men10 had re-
sponded to the call of La France. 
r·lake for the mountains! 
By the thousands, young Frenchmen are 
refusing to leave for Germany. By 
the thousands, the "deserters" from 
deportation who tomorrow will be the 
soldiers of liberation are taking to 
the mountains of Savoie, the IVIassif 
Central, the Jura, and the Var. It 
is a magnificent stand, an awakening 
of our people to shout "no" to the 11 
Nazi tyrants. 
The Resistance continued to grow throughout 1943. 
By 1944, as it became increasingly evident that the end 
was approaching for Germany, more and more tlattentists ", 
often contemptuouslY referred to by long-term Resisters 
as "September resisters·!, joined the B.esistance. Because 
de Gaulle was essentially a conservative, another inter-
esting turnabout occurred. "As the time of liberation 
approached, bringing the prospect of serious disorders 
and indeed the possibility of civil war, the same con-
servative social forces that had established and supported 
the Vichy regime ; • •• , rested upon the General their 
hopes of avoiding anarchy after the occupier's departure. u12 
Yet the core of the Resistance remained those people 
on the other end of the political spectrum from the col-
laborators, those who were persecuted and had little to 
lose, undoubtedly an important catalyst in their willing-
ness to resist. However, the idealistic and moral nature 
of the Resistance must not be overlooked. As Michel 
points out, the L\esistance was an army of volunteers, 
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and such an army needs to feel that it is fighting for 
a just cause. 13 The Vichy press constantly referred to 
them as bandits and terrorists and called on true French-
men to follow the Vichy leaders, who were serving France's 
best interests. The Resistance had to devalue this propa-
ganda to keep up its own morale and to let people inside 
and outside of France know that there was another France 
that did not support Vichy policies. npetain is not France " , 
wrote Jean Gu~henno. "Petain and Laval do not speak for 
us. Their word is not binding on us and is powerless 
to dishonor us.«14 
Patriotism was the foremost motivation. From de 
Gaulle to the Communists, all resisters shouted, ttVive 
la France tf • "Our country is in mortal peril, let us all 
fight to save her",15 wrote de Gaulle. In a moving let-
ter to his parents, Henri Fertet, sixteen years old and 
condemned to death for Resistance activity, wrote, "What 
more honorable death could I have? I am dying voluntarily 
for my country • • • Just the same, it is hard to die. 
Vive la France. u16 
However, patriotism alone is not enough to explain 
the decision to resist. Even the collaborators claimed 
to be patriotic and saw themselves as serving France's 
interests by preserving the colonial empire, avoiding 
total occupation, building a European economic bloc with 
Germany at the center, and in general making the best of 
a bad situation. Those who remained passive may have 
loved their country, yet they were to a certain extent 
pacified by Vichy propaganda and, in any case, were un-
willing to fight and risk their lives for France, espe-
cially when a struggle against the Germans seemed hope-
less. 
The decision to resist went beyond patriotism, or 
perhaps it was patriotism of a different nature. First 
of all, to resist meant not to lose hope. Debu-Bridel, 
better known for his pseudonym Vercors, wrote, 
Three months ago I longed for death. 
And I was not alone in this. As far 
as we could see, before us stretched 
only a foul abyss ••• How strange all 
that seems today when we have so many 
reasons for hope ••• But hope and hope-
lessness are neither reasoning nor 17 
reasonable states. 
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The hope of the i{esistance contrasts so sharply with the 
defeatism of the collab~ators because the resisters 
thought differently about France's situation. Their hope 
was inspired by looking beyond France to what they saw 
as the larger global perspective. The defeat of 1940 
was not definitive, as General de Gaulle so clearly put 
it, 
France has lost a Battle! 
But France has not lost the War!18 
The way he saw it, "nothing is lost because this war is , I, .f.tH~ SDt7IlJaJ 
hc\1'( !)Of 1e.:r mICe. ~lt1l~e-1 v~ r 
a world war. In the free universe, tremendous forces ~ 
A 
fAts( ~f)rce$ Will crush the enemy. tf 19 Jean Guehenno agreed that "the only 
valid measure of the disaster must be on a world scale. 
On the world scale, irance is not beaten. u20 
:Resisters, with very few exceptions, were anti-fas-
cist, and thus conceding to work with Germany was unthink-
64 
able. They were also a mixture of Left Republicans to 
Communists, and so were willing to work with the Russians 
and the Anglo-Americans. Although the relationshop be-
tween de Gaulle and the Allies was often stormy, he never 
doubted the importance they would play in liberating France. 
flWe are acting in close cooperation with our Allies and 
particularly with the British Empire. ,,21 Rather than 
condemning England for having deserted France at Dun-
kirk, he commended England for "having faced Fate alone, 
with magnificent courage, in the darkest hourn. 22 To 
the United States, he said, "What makes a great nation 
is not only vast resources, but also the courage to pledge 
all its power and to accept every sacrifice in the service 
of an ideal. You Americans are doing just that, for you 
are waging war ff • 23 Finally, the entry of the Soviet Union 
in 1941, which the Collaborators used to strengthen their 
assertion that Germany was a rampart against bolshevism, 
was seen by the Resistance as a great event. "Suffering 
France is with suffering Russia. Fighting France is with 
fighting Russia. n24 
Resistance ideology ran counter to nazism, but Resis-
tance writings often played more on the traditional Ger-
manophobia and on the humiliation France was suffering 
u~der the German occupation. ~ance had been reduced to 
one-third of her size, Alsace had been completely taken 
over, inflation and shortages resulted from German requi-
sitions, French soldiers remained in Prisoner-of-War camps, 
and after 1943 Frenchmen were forced into labor service, 
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deported, and repressed. 
"It wasn't enough to see the Germans in Paris - there 
had to be Frenchmen to thank them tl ,25 v~ote Pere Duchesne. 
To the Resistance the worst humiliation came not from 
the Germans but from those Frenchmen ready to sacrifice 
France's honor by allowing the Germans to plunder France 
without protest. They saw through the Vichy gamble and 
knew that accepting defeat did not mean the end of France's 
suffering and trouble. The Germans were occupiers, not 
partners, and even if the best that could be done was to 
bargain with Germany to save what was left, the Vichy 
leaders were a disappointment because they could not 
accomplish what they had promised. De Gaulle accused 
the Vichy leaders of having "capitulated, yielding to 
panic, forgetting honor, delivering the land over to ser-
vitude".26 Jean Paulhan wrote of Vichy leaders, ffthey 
are a lot of swine 1J ,27 and France D'Abord described Laval 
as "the old jerk from Vichy with the Auvergnat, black 
teeth, white tie and all n • 28 Hesisters were aware that 
they were fighting Vichy as well as Ger~any. ~efense ~ 
la France, an underground paper put out by university 
students, pointed out that France could not, without los-
ing its honor, evade the "dreadful duty of war ••• The 
viels have fallen. The truth that Petain had hoped to 
conceal stands out: to fight means freedom, to cringe 
means slavery.,,29 
Freedom was among the fundamental principle~ that 
could not be sacrificed under any circumstances. The 
Resisters were ready to fight and die for their principles, 
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and even for smaller, seeningly ftinsignificant things 
like a song, a snap of the fingers, a smile ll • 30 Whether 
or not the struggle ended in victory, the protest had to 
be made. "You can squeeze a bee in your hand until it 
smothersU, wrote Paulhan.t'It will not smother without 
having stung you. It stings in vain, you say. Yes, it 
is in vain. But if it did not sting you, there would 
long ago have been no more bees.,,31 In choosing free-
dom for humanity, and in having the courage to face pos-
sible death for their choice, resisters felt a renewed 
sense of personal freedom. Although they were hounded 
and persecuted, Marcel Fouch-Degliame, the editor of ~­
~, remembered feeling free from tithe problems of evory-
day life in the same sense that, being outside organized 
society, all of society's objectives did not affect us 
very much a • 32 Beyond that, Sartre felt that "we have 
never been so free as under the German occupation. We 
have lost every right, and above all the right of speech. 
i . . Because of this we were free. Since the Nazi venom 
penetrated our very thoughts, every tr~thought was a 
victory.,,33 For Sartre, each individual resister had 
chosen, had decided what values were truly important 
to him, and the choice was genuine since it could always 
be expressed in terms of Hbetter death than • n34 • • 
Guehenno agreed with Sartre that the Germans, lIa tyrannical 
power, by at.tributing so much to our thoughts, obliges 
us to recognize how untoward and irrepressible they are. 
It gives us back to ourselves ••• Now they (our thoughts) 
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e.re going to begin to cost us something. That is good. n35 
Another fundamental principle was the defense of 
human dignity. For this reason, the deportations of the 
Jews aroused disgust and outrage. It was at thiB point 
that the official Catholic Church protested, in an address 
of the Cardinals and Archbishops of the Occupied Zone, 
to Marshal petain. "Profoundly moved by what is reported 
about the massive arrests of Jews carried out last week, 
and about the harsh treatment that was inflicted upon 
them, particularly at the Velodrome d'Hiver, we can not 
suppress our conscience's outcry,q It is in the name of 
humanity and Christian principles that our voices rise 
to protest for the imprescriptible rights of the human 
person. 1136 The Cahiers ~ Temoignage Chretien, a group 
formed to help Jewish children escape to Switzerland, 
put out a tract entitled, "France, Take Heed of Losing 
Your Soul n • It warned Frenchmen about the insidious pro-
cess beginning with the seduction of nazism as a rampart 
against bolshevism and a force for order, leading to a 
compromise by collaboration and ending with the total 
perversion and destruction of Chris~ian vel~es~ - It called 
upon the Christians of France to be prepared to suffer. 
"We will not stop opposing the triumph of Nazi principles 
whatever form they are clothed in • • • If some of the 
stones that hit Jesus touch us, don't be surprised. It 
proves we are with him. But above all, let us not join, 
let us never join, to save ourselves, with those who throw 
the stones. u37 
Those who resisted on moral grounds saw that the 
first step in the destruction of morality was allowing 
oneself to be compromised by allowing evil without pro-
test. Defense ~ la France wrote, "To accept in silence 
the wrong that had been done you may be a sign of greatr 
ness of soul or of saintliness. But to allow evil to 
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be done without protest ••• in the name of Christian 
charity or humaneness, is vile and hypocritical weakness. ,,38 
c}l1J.(it1 
As for Christi~ the Radio Vatican reminded France in 
1941, i'There are times when one must not cede - when 
justice dominates charity because the charity that sac-
rificelS justice is a bad charity.,,39 
~hese principles even justified social disorder. 
To the collaborators, disorder and "terrorism" were the 
highest evil to be avoided at all costs, a primary motive 
for collaborating and for aiding the Germans in the re-
pression of the Resistance. Marcel Fouch-Degliame, the 
editor of Combat, knew that lIin general the establishment 
considered us extrenely dangerous individuals. Really, 
they thought we were going to send France through fire 
and blood with ill-considered actions. ft40 Most internal 
Resisters did not consider social disorder the highest 
evil, but felt rather that the loss of freedom, the hu-
miliation of their country and its compromise to Nazi 
principles and policies justified disobedience and in 
some cases, killing. 
Up to now I have spoken of the Resistance as a whole, 
and while there were broad areas of consensus and a simi-
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larity of outlook, conflict and disagreement arose within 
the Resistance over both the means and the ends of their 
actions. All Resisters agreed that their primary concern 
and the immediate goal of all their actions was the liber-
ation of France, but they disagreed as to the best way 
to go about this. Essentially, the split was between 
the external and the internal rlesistance. Within France, 
the itesistance wished to Ucreate a certain psychological 
climate around the Germans, to keep them in partial ter-
ror all the time, cutting telegraph wires and waiting for 
the Allies to land so we could blow up everything. u41 
In this group, the Communists were undoubtedly a "magnetic 
pole u , as Jacques Duclos, the leader of the Communist Party 
during the occupation, put it. ttWe were fighters, whereas 
there were a lot of talkers. n42 Those who believed in 
direct immediate action wanted not only to terrorize the 
Germans, they also felt it was important for morale to 
keep themselves active. "Resistance is permanent guerilla 
warfare. Three guys intercepting a German convoy in a 
road, throwing three grenades, firing their machine guns, 
and disappearing into the countryside. And that was the 
only war, not only for training fighters, but for keeping 
them. ,,43 
De Gaulle and his followers, on the other hand, felt 
the price paid was too high, especially after the inci-
dents in Nantes and Bordeaux, where over a hundred hos-
tages were shot in retaliation for the assassination of 
a German officer. De Gaulle, in response to this inci-
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dent, allowed that nit is both right and natural that 
Germans should be killed by Frenchmen • • • But there 
are tactics in war • • • My orders to those in occupied 
territory are, for the moment, not to kill Germans, for 
the good reason that it is too easy for the enemy to re-
taliate. n44 
This conflict over -means led:~ to a certain amount 
of distrust and tension. Jacques Duclos felt that florders 
like that should not be obeyed ll • 45 The disagreement over 
aims created even more disaccord, particularly among the 
various political tendencies within the Resistance. All 
Resisters agreed that after the Liberation France would 
need radical reforms, that victory would not be complete 
without a renewed France. However, nobody, republicans 
included, wanted a return to the Third Republic. ~ Popu-
laire denied any claim that the Third Republic should 
be rescusitated after the war. "It gave itself up volun-
tarily to death.1!46 Liberation-~ had "no tenderness 
for the scandalous pre-war assemblies that, one night, 
out of stupeur and shame, abandoned the Fatherland and 
the Republic to play the game of defeat's adventurers. u47 
Philippe Vianny not only felt that the Third Republic 
had abdicated its powers, but that "France does not want 
any more 'miserables' ••• France needs new men.,,48 
Even Leon Blum wrote to de Gaulle that although the new 
French state should be a democracy, he did not want the 
restoration of prewar institutions. ttNothing could be 
further removed from our thoughts. u49 
Yet, unlike the collaborators, they did not condemn 
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the Republic for the defeat. "We will not admit", wrote 
Jean Guehenno, "that France for these last fifty years 
has been so ugly and ignoble. 1I50 De Gaulle, in a Christ-
mas message to the children of France, reassured them that 
lithe enemy and his friends say that France deserved to 
be beaten. But the French nation is made up of your Fa-
thers and Mothers, your brothers.and sisters, and you, 
children, know very well they were not to blame.,,51 
While all resisters believed that France would have 
to be rebuilt after the war, and that they would avoid 
returning the constitution or institutions of the Third 
Republic, sharp disagreement arose over exactly what form 
France should take after the war. It certainly would be 
unacceptable that f'the terrible ordeal should leave stand-
ing a social and moral regime that played against the 
nation". 52 The Free French of the Interior, while ad-
mitting the need for reform, wanted to put off even dis-
cussion of aims until after the Liberation. "When a house 
is burning, that is not the time to reset the faulty foun-
dation. First it is necessary to put out the fire that 
threatens to devour everything. ft53 
De Gaulle set out his aims as three articles. Ar-
ticle One, to wage war, was the most important. Yet he 
also realized that rJwe cannot remain indifferent to the 
destiny which can and should be hers in the sphere of 
domestic politics ••.• Without any shadow of a doubt, 
when France emerges from her terrible ordeal, we shall 
witness a tremendous national revival. Need I say that 
the Free French, of all people, could never wish to 
oppose such a transformation. ,,54 However, Article Two 
dealing with the transformation was rather vague. tIThe 
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people must be allowed to choose for themselves as soon 
as circumstances make it possible to say freely what they 
want and what they will not tolerate.,,55 The only other 
goals were Honor and Country, Liberty, Equality, and 
Fraternity, and Article Three, Liberation, meaning not 
only the defeat of the enemy but also the establishment 
of conditions in which Frenchmen could live, work, and 
act in dignity and security. 
The goals of both the internal and external Free 
t..of)"e.rn 
French were vague because they were a secondarYI\ and be-
cause the Free French, in general career military men, 
were somewhat wary of the internal resistance's radical-
ism which was beyond their control. Among the more radi-
cal members of the Resistance disagreements arose over 
~rance's future. Most resisters agreed on political demo-
cracy based on universal suffrage, freedom of speech, 
press, and assembly, women's franchise, the inviability 
of the home, and secrecy of correspondence, respect for 
the human person, and equality before the law. The pri-·· 
mary source of conflict was France's economic future. 
The more radical movements, such as ~ Voix ~ ~, 
called for action against the powerful capitalists who 
ran France without concern for the workers and sacrificed 
the nation's good for their narrow self-interests. 1! 
Revue Libre claimed that Hitler had dealt capitalism its 
death blow and called for the destruction of its last 
vestiges. Franc-Tireur, a Communist paper, called for 
a constitutional affirmation of each individual's right 
to a part of the national income, the socialization of 
public services including banks and insurance, planned 
production, and social discipline imposed by a strong 
state. 
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Then there were those still on the Left, socialists 
and syndicalists, who still spoke of l~beration from 
capitalist exploitation, yet did not call for the sys-
tem's destruction but rather for its transformation. 
1iberer £1 Federer and Lib€rati~n were both opposed to 
the centralization called for by the more radical resis-
ters. Rather, they preferred economic and political life 
based on small units, communes or federations, that 
would govern themselves. Finally, in the Left-Center, 
were those who called for a continuation of the Revolu-
tion of 1798, more Equality, more Liberty, and more Fra-
ternity. The Mouvement Unie de la Resistance (MUR), as-
~------~ ---- -- -- ----=-----
serted that ftthe Resistance will not become an anticapi-
talist movement Jl ,56 a decision only the people could 
make only after the Liberation. 
The tension that had existed since the Thirties 
between the Socialists and the Communists erupted after 
the Socialists published a lengthy tract setting out 
their specific aims for postwar France. The Communists 
then put out detailed critique of the Socialist program, 
denouncing its vagueness and its failure to recognize 
that none of their aims, a decent wage for all, rational-
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ized production, could be accomplished without liquidat-
ing trusts. 'rhe Socialists then published a defense of 
their original program, contin~ng a by now familiar 
quarrel. 
Al though this dttssention was always just under the 
surface (anyone who carefully read the various tracts 
could discern that the groups had contradictory aims), 
open arguing like this was unusual, especially since the 
Communists did their best not to alarm their fellow re-
sisters and stressed the unity needed to carryon the 
struggle. The Conseil National de ls Resistance was 
formed to unite the various tendencies so as to coordi-
nate their activities as the Liberation approached. A 
list of the groups it finally did include indicates the 
difficul ty of the task: the l'-10uvement de Liberation Na-
tional (included Combat, Franc-Tireur, Liberation, France 
A£ Combat, D~fense de la France, Lorraine, and Resistance), 
La Front Nationale t L:Organization Civile et Militaire, 
Liberation-Nord, Ceux de la Resistance, La Confederation 
~~~~~ ---- ---- -- -- -- --~~~~~~ 
G€n€rale de Travail, la Confederation Fran~aise ~ Tra-
vailleurs Chretiens, Ie Parti Communiste, Ie Parti Social-
iste, Ie Parti :lepublicaine-rtadicale et Radicale-Socialiste, 
; 
le Parti Democrate Populaire, l'Alliance Democratique, 
and the Federation Aepublicaine. 
In March, 1944, they were able to publish a common 
program of political democracy, liberty, suffrage, and 
also set out various economic goals: the eviction of 
large economic feudalities from the direction of the 
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economy, rational economic organization which would assure 
the subordination of particular interests to the general 
interest, the intensification of national production ac-
cording to a plan drawn up by the state in consultation 
with representatives of production, a return to the na-
tion of the monopolized means of production, the fruits 
of common work, energy sources, and underground resources, 
insurance companies and large banks, the development of 
agricultural and trade co-operatives, the right of access 
to management of industry to qualified workers and their 
participation in economic direction, social security, 
the reconstitution of unions and syndicates, a minimum 
wage, and allocations for the victims of £ascist terror. 57 
The goals were fairly general and left out how 
these changes were to be accomplished, yet considering 
the range of movements included and the variety of opinions 
among them, this program represented a miracle of compro-
mise. While this union was not likely to survive past 
the Liberation, all resisters of whatever political or 
religious tendency agreed on "this single idea that made 
it possible for us all to work with each other in spite 
of everything, we were all agreed on getting rid of Ger-
many and nazism. ,,58 The similarities among them overrode 
their differences. More importantly, they all knew, while 
they believed liberation alone was not enough, that fight-
ing among themselves would only lead to their own destruc-
tion. Labaume, a Catholic priest and resister, described 
the situation as "a river in torrent, where there are 
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pebbles, pieces of wood, paper, all of that, yet they 
all flow in the same direction even though they are not 
the same. And it was a bit like that. "59 Another atten-
uating factor in the disputes was that the rank-and-file 
membership of each group cut across party affiliations. 
Those who strongly wanted to act joined whatever move-
ment they found and stuck with it, pretty much ignoring 
the quarrels of their leaders. Most resisters did not 
even differentiate between the English services and those 
of the Free French. 
A final unifying factor was the symbol of de Gaulle. 
rnoV'('II",f,(lt 
Every ResistanceAeventually adopted de Gaulle as their 
ultimate leader because they realized his symbolic impor-
tance. Leon Blum in 1942 wrote, "I believe, for myself, 
entirely and firmly in the integrity 2nd the loyalty of 
the General. I trust in him. H60 Combat described him 
as "the one who refused to lay down his arms, the one 
who saved honor and kept his word, the one whose example 
gave the French the confidence and the eneCJ::'gy that ani-
mated them, the one who represents fighting France, eter-
nal France.,,61 The Socialists agreed. "For us, General 
de Gaulle is the natural and necessary symbol of the ~ 
sistance and the Liberation. ,,62 Liberation-Sud was also 
for de. Gaulle, flnot for reasons of clan or interest but 
because he knew how to create in France the union of 
French patriots against the foreign invasion. ,,63 Be-
cause de Gaulle was Uthe rock in the tempest upon which 
all French contradictions dashed themselves into a Least 
Common Denominator ll ,64 he represented a new force in 
French politics. He was able to unite not only the Re-
sistance but eventually drew the support of conservative 
social forces that saw in him hope for avoiding anarchy. 
De Gaulle was a legend, a miracle man, able to insure 
France a place in the Allied Camp and to keep the inter-
nal contradictions and quarrels from destroying France. 
Overcoming these internal fragmentations, even tem-
porarily, was one significant achievement of the Resis-
tance, a movement whose accomplishments are difficult to 
measure. Their military contributions, how much they 
were able to slow down the Germans, the importance of 
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the information they sent to the Allies, to what extent 
they diverted G-erman divisions during D-Day, ,,{ere really 
of minor importance. In these terms the war ran its 
course without the Resistance having much effect. Their 
papers and tracts were more significant as they let people 
within and outside of France know there was active oppo-
sition to the Germans and to Vichy, and also to some ex-
tent counteracted the ubiquitous collaborationist and fas-
cist propaganda. Yet eV8n their papers reached, according 
to Paxton, not more than ten percent of the population. 
The Resistance did bequeath to France impa~tant post-war 
leaders, allowed France to be represented as an Allied 
power, and to set up her own provisional government. 
Finally, the B.esistance changed the lives of those who 
participated in it; they left with a sense of dignity 
and self-worth. That they kept hope alive proved to be 
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a legacy for the future. The R.esistance's most profound 
impact was this moral significance. It proved that there 
were people ready to fight and even die to save France, 
to preserve liberty, to protest for the respect of human 
dignity, and even for "a song, a snap of the fingers, 
a smile lf • 
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CONCLUSION 
The French responded to the Occupation of France in 
three ways. The collaborators, traditional rightists, 
decided that France's best option was to work with the 
Germans, to make the best of the situation and perhaps 
even to profit from it by becoming Germany's partner in 
82 
a European bloc. Because France had been defeated and 
occupied by Germany, a certain amount of collaboration 
was inevitable. Yet French collaboration went far beyond 
this minimum. Collaborators intended to make use of the 
defeat to remake France, and were able to go as far as 
they did in this respect only because they were not op-
posed by the majority of the French people. These people 
chose not to become actively involved and simply allowed 
events to run their course. Because of the existence 
of a French state whose legitimacy derived from the French 
Constituent Assembly, rather tha.n from appOintment by 
the Germans, the majority of the people were led into 
complicity with programs and policies, in particular de-
portation, of which they would never have ~pproved under 
normal circumstances. But the French people as a whole 
were not held responsible for their nation'S crimes. 
They denied any association with the collaborators and 
identified, rather, with the Resisters. This third group 
refused to accept the defeat, and considered that the 
rebuilding of France could only happen after the Libera-
tion from German occupat&on. They considered working 
with Germany under any circumstances a compromise of 
France's honor. 
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By identi,fying only with the Hesistance, the French 
peoples' selective rewriting of their own and their na-
tion's past has prevented them from eX8.mining what 
cimounted to their passive collaboration. Though we may 
find this an unattractive way of dealing with such a 
demoralizing and disordered time, it has been the French 
peoples' way of putting the war behind them and being 
able to look toward the future. Recent scholarship has 
attempted to rec2.pture the true nature of events, but 
the French people's real cD.tharsis has not yet occurred. 
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